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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 1 The definition of what constitutes a "public use," as
opposed to a private use, has endured a number of permutations since
t The Author dedicates this Comment to her husband, Mark Folden
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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its inception, and is synonymous today
with "public purpose,"' 2 which
3
development.
may include economic
When it comes to economic development as a public use, the public
has generally left to the legislature the decision of whether, with regard to property rights, the "needs of the many outweigh the needs of
the few," or the one. But until recently, the public tended to rely on
the courts to stop takings once the legislature made a decision.4 When
"public purpose" can be met by almost any definition and courts defer
to the legislature, the only remaining solutions, based on the separation of powers, are constitutional or legislative change. But such
change must be considered in context, because the assertion by private property rights activists, that no property owner's rights are safe
if economic development can be used as a justification for eminent
domain,5 is not entirely accurate either.
To evaluate the true risk to property owners, as well as the likelihood that an economic development-based taking would occur at all
in a geospatial context,6 the judicial and legislative pronouncements
on "public use" must be considered. Factors inherent in corporate site
selection already' exist to restrain takings decisions,7 because of the
economic, social, and political costs involved, in addition to the procedural constraints and expense associated with condemnation proceedings.8 The evaluation issue is critically important, not only to property
owners, but also to communities, in terms of finding the appropriate
balance between jobs and private property, and in drawing, or re2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See Kelo v.City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005); Infra Part II.C.2.
4. See infra Part II.D.3.
5. Institute for Justice, U.S. Supreme Court Accepts Review of New London
Eminent Domain Abuse Case, Sept. 28, 2004, http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/9_28_04pr.html. Dana Berliner, Institute for Justice senior attorney, states
that, "If jobs and taxes can be a justification for taking someone's home or business,
then no property in America is safe because anyone's home can create more jobs if it
is replaced by a business and any small business can generate greater taxes if replaced
by a bigger one." Id. See also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) ("The decision that the
prospect of increased employment, tax revenue, and general economic stimulation
makes a taking of private property for transfer to another private party sufficiently
'public' to authorize the use of the power of eminent domain means that there is
virtually no limit to the use of condemnation to aid private businesses."). Authorizing
local legislative bodies to determine that a different use will produce greater public
benefit means that "no homeowner's, merchant's, or manufacturer's property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for the benefit of other private interests that will put it to a 'higher' use." Id.
6. For example, planners, corporate site selectors, and economic developers use
tools for economic analysis like location theory. See infra Part II.D.2.
7. While the weight allocated to each factor in a site selection decision will be
different (much like each case turning on its own facts), there are some common denominators. See infra Part II.A.1, D.2.
8. See infra Part II.D.1.
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drawing, the line between the rights of the community and the individual property owner. So while the use of eminent domain for economic
development's siren song could potentially destroy inattentive property owners on the rocks of legislative overreaching and judicial deference, these other factors must be examined in making a true
assessment of the risk. The "risk" itself often appears in the form illustrated by the hypothetical below.
Big Corporation engages in a discussion with a North Texas city
about possibly relocating to the area with an as-yet undetermined, but
presumably large, number of new, well-paying jobs. The unemployment rate has been rising, and many of the city's older companies
have down-sized or relocated, while the tax base has continued to decline. Big Corporation claims that it needs a particular piece of real
estate, which a group of homeowners and local businesses has refused
to sell to it. The property owners also refuse to sell to the city. In
Texas, prior to the latest legislative actions, the city could probably
have taken the property upon payment of "adequate compensation,"
using the eminent domain power, under the justification that economic development was a "public use," and then leased or resold the
property to the business.
The idea of using eminent domain for economic development is not
new, but urbanization and industrialization trends foster an acceleration in property redevelopment through eminent domain, sometimes
in the name of economic development.9 Economic development,
based on the idea of progress and jobs, is politically attractive to most
people, even if only a few still take the time to go to the polls.'" Voter
apathy and the nullification of judicial activism through U.S. Supreme
Court precedents 1 reduce citizens to the mercy of state legislatures
and local city councils when it comes to the use of eminent domain for
12
economic development, a precarious position in some circumstances.
The Court's precedents "appear to sanction increased legislative
power over individuals and have rendered property rights, once traditionally thought of as an individual protection against the state, as
mercurial limits upon political power. "13
In light of earlier changes to the Texas constitution, 4 Texans could
not rely on the judiciary to defend their property against takings for
purely economic development purposes. And now, instead of Texas
voters themselves taking action through the electoral process to retain
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.1., B.2.b.
11. See infra Part II.C.1.
12. See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 238, 241 (1829) (according to Justice Story,
"government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left
solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint").
13. DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2-3
(1992).
14. See infra Part II.C.2.
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their private property rights, through careful tailoring of local ability
to use the eminent domain power as it pertains to economic development,' 5 the state legislature has preemptively passed a statute to limit
such use. 16 Texans, individually or through interest groups, must
make their voices heard to their local and state elected officials, in
order to both protect property rights and still obtain the benefit of
economic development opportunities.
North Texas is the focus of this Comment because it is a microcosm
of the interaction between competing economic and social forces,
both external, in the form of global competition, and internal, as an
area of the state with one of the country's fastest growing and most
diverse populations.' 7 Section II of this article will examine this context, as well as federal and Texas judicial actions, to assess the economic development takings environment prior to the most recent
federal case and acts of the Texas Legislature. Section III will explain
the effect this combination has had in producing a constitutional imbalance. Section IV will conduct an examination of proposed solutions at the constitutional, judicial, and legislative levels from the
literature and case law on the subject. Section V will conclude with
predictions about the likely success of recent legislative enactments
developing a "brighter" line between individual property rights and
community economic development.
The focus of this article is on the "public purpose" aspect of eminent domain use and strictly pertains to the taking of real property in
fee simple absolute as perceived today, not on the myriad other pur18
poses to which the eminent domain power can and has been applied,'
nor the various conceptions of "property" over time.' 9
15. Like most Americans, Texans can always rely on legislators' political incentives to respond to High Court decisions. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post'Kelo' Wave of Legislation: Eminent Domain Curbs in 28 States, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1,
2005, at 1; see Abe Levy, Perry Signs Law Limiting Eminent Domain, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 1, 2005, at 4B.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See North Central Texas Council of Governments, Center of Development Excellence, http://www.developmentexcellence.com/about.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2006)
("The number of people living in North Central Texas has grown by more than 30
percent in the last 10 years and experts predict that this trend will continue. This
means that today's population of about 5.6 million people in the Dallas/Fort Worth
region is expected to grow to more than 9 million by 2030."). See also U.S. Census
Bureau, State and County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). Texas and the United States have the same average
number of persons per square mile: 79.6. Id.
18. For example, regulatory takings restricting use of property but not physical
possession, takings of personal property, or takings of a leasehold.
19. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (2d ed. 1998) (reference to property as
"a dynamic concept": the transformation of wealth from land in the eighteenth century to intangible personal property like stock in the late twentieth century, and the
possibility of intellectual property as the most significant wealth of the twenty-first; he

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.4

4

Askew: Take It or Leave It: Eminent Domain for Economic Development-Stat527
2006]
EMINENT DOMAIN & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

II.

THE CONTEXT OF THE THREAT

Before beginning the analysis, it is advisable to develop a working
familiarity with the core concepts of economic development and eminent domain.
A.

Terminology

1. Economic Development
"Economic Development" refers to the process of site selection and
20
community marketing used to attract and retain businesses and jobs,
and ideally prevent, but at least impede, the cycle of economic decline
and urban decay.2 1 It is an attempt to influence the location decisions
of private corporations for the benefit of some particular geographic
area, either local, 22 regional, 23 state, 24 or national.25 An economic development organization attempts to strengthen an area's economic
base through several key strategies: retention and expansion of existing businesses in the area, facilitating the start-up of new businesses,
and recruitment of additional businesses from outside the geographic
area. 26 These strategies are implemented to mitigate the area's decline in competitive capacity because "[p]laces, just like corporate giants and entire industries, may rise and fall with new technologies,
new competitors, and shifting consumer preferences. "27
also notes the changes over time in the legal recognition of property rights, citing
slavery as an example.).
20. See Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don't Create
Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 97 (2000).
21. See PHILIP KOTLER ET AL., MARKETING PLACES: ATTRACTING INVESTMENT,
INDUSTRY, AND TOURISM TO CITIES, STATES, AND NATIONS 6-7 (1993).
22. See Arlington Chamber of Commerce, Economic Development Council, http:/
(last visited
/www.arlingtontx.com/3dde3faa4d3b4fe0b4f2ff04l8c3d74c/default.html
Nov. 20, 2004) (Mission: "To stimulate job growth in Arlington through Target Industry Cluster Recruitment, Business Retention and Expansion, building Arlington's image and brand recognition, and enhancing the economic climate to establish
Arlington's competitive position.").
23. North Texas Commission, http://www.ntc-dfw.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2006)
("The North Texas Commission is a regional non-profit consortium of businesses, cities, counties, chambers of commerce, economic development entities and higher education institutions in the North Texas Region. The Commission is the one and only
public-private regional organization committed to enhancing the overall economic vitality and quality of life of North Texas.").
24. See Texas Economic Development & Tourism, http://www.governor.state.tx.
us/ecodevo (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
25. See Economic Development Administration, http://www.eda.gov/AboutEDA/
AbtEDA.xml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
26. See Kotler, supra note 21, at 27-31; see also RONALD J. HUSTEDDE ET AL.,
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: A How To MANUAL 9-10 (rev. ed. 2005) (listing

five general strategies: attract new base employers, capture existing markets, encourage start-ups, help existing firms increase efficiency, and use aid from broader
levels of government).
27. KOTLER, supra note 21, at 230.
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Site selection involves an "amalgam of economic theories, demographic and industrial trend forecasts, and political understanding,
case examples, and practical experience, "28 generally following the
policy of "highest and best use"' 29 as it pertains to a specific industrial
classification. Particularly, businesses
rate places as potential sites in terms of their business climates and
regulatory environments; the caliber of the labor force; the availability of infrastructural benefits such as access to airports, good
roads, and mass transportation; the quality of the school system and
other types of training institutions; and the quality of life. Business
firms also respond to relocation inducements and incentives such as
tax concessions and tax deferrals, inexpensive land and infrastructure subsidies, and subsidized training facilities.3 °
These site selection factors receive varying weight in corporate location decision-making,3 1 and should properly be considered in evaluating the actual risk that any city will try to use eminent domain for
economic development purposes.
2.

Eminent Domain

The definition of eminent domain "involves the deprivation of the
right of the property owner to keep his property when it is needed for
public use." 3 2 The eminent domain power is a sovereign right.3 3 The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution limits use of the
eminent domain power, both in the "takings" clause and in the due
process clause.3 4 These apply to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Texas Constitution provides a very similar public
use requirement:
No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or
applied to public use without adequate compensation being made,
unless by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for
the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or se28. Id. at 20.

29.

APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE

6 (11th ed. 1996)

(Land utility and its highest and best use are affected by location and other geographical characteristics, in addition to "trends in economics, population, technology, and
culture.").

30. KOTLER, supra note 21, at 27.
31. See id.
32. Porter v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875); United States v. 12.84 Acres
of Land, 994 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1993).
34. "[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
35. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984); John Corp. v. City
of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that "principles embodied in
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment").
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cured by a deposit of money; and no irrevocable or uncontrollable
grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by the Legislature, or
36 created under its
authority shall be subject to the control thereof.
Eminent domain power is delegated to municipalities in the Texas Local Government Code.37 Cities tend to view eminent domain as "an
indispensable tool in urban redevelopment .... ," particularly when
"property owners are unwilling to sell or are demanding exorbitant
prices, figuring to cash in on a major redevelopment plan .... "38
To take private property by condemnation in Texas, after being unable to agree with the property owner as to damages, the condemning
entity must file a petition with the proper court, which (1) describes
the property to be condemned; (2) states the purpose of intended use;
(3) states the name of the property owner; and (4) states that the entity and owner are unable to agree to the amount of damages.3 9
B.

Trends Affecting the "Public Use" Interpretation:Innovation
Drives Obsolescence

40
"Public use" has traditionally been subject to two interpretations.
The narrow interpretation requires that property taken must be subject to actual "use by the public. ' 41 The broad interpretation considers eminent domain to be "coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers," such that practically any acquisition meets
the public use test as long as the court finds a rational basis.42
The evolution of the "public use" concept has been greatly affected
by trends that include growing urban concentration 43 and population
growth,44 industrialization, and the demand for jobs, arising from both

36. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; see also Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Celanse Corp.
of Am., 592 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1979); Marrs v. R.R. Comm'n, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex.
1944) (Article I, sections 3 and 19 also protect property rights in Texas. Section 3
provides for equal rights and section 19 provides for due process and equal protection
under the law.).
37. See TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 251.001(a) (Vernon 2004).
38. Jonathan Walters, For the Greater Good, 66 PLAN. 10, 12 (2000).
39. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012 (Vernon 2004); See also Edwin M. Snyder, A
Condemnation Case from the Condemner's Perspective, 31 URB. LAW. 649 (1999)
(stating the requirements of the petition).
40. See Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 705-06 (Tex. 1959).
41. City of Arlington v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960, 965 (5th Cir.
1994).
42. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984).
43. See TEXAS STATE DATA CENTER, OFFICE OF THE STATE DEMOGRAPHER, EsTIMATES OF THE TOTAL POPULATIONS OF COUNTIES AND PLACES IN TEXAS FOR JULY
1, 2003 AND JANUARY 1, 2004, TABLE 3, OCT. 2004, http://txsdc.utsa.edu/download/

pdf/estimates/2003_txpopest-msa.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).

44. See U.S.

2, POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, AREA
1790 to 1990, http://www.census.gov/population/cen-

CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE

MEASUREMENTS, AND DENSITY:

susdata/table-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter
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domestic and international market forces.45 While property has been

actively redeveloped in the United States since at least the nineteenth
century,46 new technology has a way of "rendering obsolete older
forms of property and wealth," 47 as does policy response: "[d]uring
the last several decades, all levels of government have become in-

and taxacreasingly active, through planning, regulation, spending, 48
tion, in influencing the use of land, and activities on land."
1.

Federal Context

In 1750, most of the people living in what would become the United
States made their living from agriculture. 49 As of the first U.S. Census

in 1790, there were over 3 million people living in the approximate

864,746 square miles of U.S. land area.50 Population density existed at
4.5 persons per square mile. 51 There were only twenty-four places
classified as "urban," containing approximately five percent of the total population.5 2
Colonial policies favored industrial development, as did the postcolonial United States.5 3 For example, the Mills Acts of the nineteenth century allowed land to be taken from a private owner, usually
by flooding, and essentially given to the private mill owner, for the
public's benefit. 54 But as early as the 1780s, public leaders "were
bothered by this gap between the philosophical commitment to private property as a fundamental value in a free society and the in-

fringement of these rights by state legislatures[ ]" in their use of
eminent domain.55
In the nineteenth century, an "overabundance of publicly owned
lands" generated little need to definitively limit eminent domain's
45. N.A. Phelps & N. Parson, Edge Urban Geographies:Notes from the Margins of
Europe's Capital Cities, 40 URBAN STUDIES 1725, 1726 (2003) ("Glocalization" as defining the "interconnections between processes at various spatial scales.").
46. See ELY, supra note 19, at 6 ("Economic development was a primary objective
of Americans in the nineteenth century .. ").
47. Id. at 6-7 (stating as example the transportation-based transition in the United
States: canals, which were replaced by railroads, which were replaced by airplanes).
48. Ann Louise Strong & Daniel R. Madelker, PropertyRights and Takings, 62 J.
AM. PLAN. Ass'N 5, 5-6 (1996).
49. See ELY, supra note 19, at 16 ("Most of the colonists owned land, and eighty
percent of the population derived their living from agriculture.").
50. See TABLE 2, supra note 44.
51. See id.
52. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 4, POPULATION: 1790-1990, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter TABLE 4]. For current official definitions of the terms "urban" and "rural," visit the U.S.
Census Bureau website, http://www.census.gov (search "FAQs" for "urban"; then follow "Definition: urban and rural" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
53. J.W. HARRINGTON & BARNEY WARF, INDUSTRIAL LOCATION: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICE, & POLICY 123 (1995) (recognizing capitalism as one of the drivers for initiating mass urbanization in industrialized societies).
54. SCHULTZ, supra note 13, at 26.
55. ELY, supra note 19, at 26.
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"public use."' 56 But rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth century led to correspondingly rapid urbanization, 57 a catalyst, combined
with poor housing conditions, which led eventually to the blight re-

moval programs popular in the 1950s. 58 Industrialization and urbanization led to the need for greater governmental administration: the
rise of the national bureaucratic state, 59 a "newer, stronger" govern-

ment, which "required the courts to give deference to the legislatures
in struggling to manage ever more complex relations among competing actors. '6° Post-World War II, population movement to the sub-

urbs "became a dramatic, extraordinarily consistent, four-decade
process characterized by a massive shift in the location and design of

housing, shopping, work places and jobs .... International competition also had a significant effect: "[a]s manufacturing jobs were lost
to global competition and technological trends increased the relative
mobility of capital, cities came under increased pressure to attract and
hold onto large employers."62
Today, the United States is home to over 290,809,777 people. 63 It
holds over 8,000 "urban" places, containing approximately 75% of the

population. 64 The physical territory of the United States is made up

of over three million square miles, with over 70.3 persons per square
66
mile,65 and the gross domestic product is around $12,485.7 billion.
56. Daniel B. Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1499-500 (1966).
57. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning,and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 699, 706 (1993).
58. See id. at 711. "From the perspective of the 1990s, one has difficulty appreciating the squalor of the nineteenth century slum." Id.
59. See Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House With Sticks": The
Splintering of Property Interests Under the Fifth Amendment may be Hazardous to

PrivateProperty, 20

HARV. ENVTL.

L. REV. 397, 417 (1996).

60. Id.
61. Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest Destiny and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REV. 327, 329 (1993). For example, "[b]etween
1947 and 1967, America's sixteen largest and oldest central cities lost an average of
34,000 manufacturing jobs each, while their suburbs gained an average of 87,000 jobs.
This trend continued through the 1970s as America's industrialized cities lost from
25% (Minneapolis) to 40% (Philadelphia) of the manufacturing jobs that remained."
Id. at 333.
62. Weber, supra note 20, at 100.
63. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES, AND FOR PUERTO Rico: APRIL 1, 2000 TO
JULY 1, 2003, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2003-Ol.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter TABLE 1].
64. See TABLE 4, supra note 52.
65. See TABLE 2, supra note 44.
66. ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, TABLE 3, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED MEASURES: LEVEL AND CHANGE FROM PRECEDING PERIOD,

http://www.economicindicators.gov/ (follow "Gross Domestic Product" hyperlink;
then follow "Tables: XLS" hyperlink, then follow "Table 3") (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
From 1995 to 2000, durable goods manufacturing, specifically computer and electronic
products, was the fastest-growing industry. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, NEWS
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"Public purpose" is now construed pursuant to the trends affecting
land redevelopment and their underlying "money and public policy
trails." 67 One significant trend is the "inner ring" phenomenon: small
towns surrounded by the interstate ring system, or neighboring cities,
with no place left to grow.6" This is a situation that tends to foster
redevelopment of property through eminent domain, due to an inability to continue the process of "urban sprawl."6 9
While industrialization and urbanization have had a significant impact on land use, 7° consider the recent statistics with regard to takings
and threats of takings for economic development purposes in the
United States: from January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2002, approximately 10,282 properties were threatened, and 3,722 actually
taken. 71 Based on these statistics, as well as the number of people and
potential properties in the United States, 72 one may rationally conclude that takings for economic development have not yet reached the
level of an epidemic. Particularly in light of the prior history of redevelopment in the United States, displacement74 is not a new occurrence; 73 it is just more highly-publicized today.
One other trend may have significant bearing: even as population
has increased, voter participation has seen a significant decline until
http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2004/naics.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
67. See Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planningand Law
Gone Astray?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 345, 353 (1997). Epstein
cites as incentives for suburbanization and sprawl "support for home mortgages; single family mortgages insurable in a government-backed securities market; accelerated
depreciation; five-year amortization; and deductability of 'passive' real estate losses,
[which] represent federal tax policies that have served as a subsidy to sprawl. Even
the definitive selection of automobile infrastructure as that which would receive overwhelming public financial support, has helped promote the current national profile of
urbanization." Id. at 355.
68. See Aoki, supra note 57, at 743 ("Road construction wreaked a fundamental
change on the form and appearance of American cities and towns.").
69. See Epstein, supra note 67, at 347. Epstein describes "sprawl" as "large expanses of low-density, single-use development, married with strip and auto-oriented
commercial land uses, at the very edges or beyond the fringes of existing urbanization." Id.
70. See Amnon Frenkel, A Land-Consumption Model: Its Application to Israel's
Future Spatial Development, J. Am. PLAN. Ass'N, Autumn 2004, at 455. Impact of the
acceleration of urban sprawl in North America after rapid population growth postWWII, "expressed by the mass movement of urban populations from the cities to the
suburbs," and the "negative impact of market forces on the spatial distribution of
Id.
population and on the supply of land ....
71. Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain:A Five Year, State-By-State Report
Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain, SJ051 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 189, 197 (2003).
72. See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 64-67.
73. Aoki, supra note 57, at 768 ("From 1949 to 1961, urban renewal displaced
85,000 families in 200 American cities, while federally funded renewal and highway
programs displaced about 100,000 families and 15,000 businesses per year.").
74. See infra Part II.D.3.
RELEASE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY,
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the most recent presidential election.75 According to Federal Election
Commission statistics, in Presidential election years, percent turnout
of voting age population declined from 63.06% in 1960 to 49.08% in
1996, while in mid-term election years, percent turnout of voting age
population declined from 47.27% in 1962 to 38.78% in 1994.76 This
decline in voter participation may have had a corresponding negative
effect on keeping the legislature in check.
2.
a.

Texas Context

Geography: Growth in People and Places

Texas had an estimated 22,490,022 residents as of July 1, 2004, 7 7 and
78
is composed of approximately 261,797 square miles of territory.
North Texas has been a recipient of tremendous population growth;
for example, Plano, a North Texas city, is ranked at number eight in
the category of "Cities with 100,000 or more in population," for high79
est percent growth in the nation between the 1990 and 2000 census.
North Texas, like other areas of the United States, suffers from the
development of the "inner ring" phenomenon.8 0 Faced with population growth, the expansion of suburbs, and a corresponding decline in
the tax base,81 "inner ring" cities are forced to consider property redevelopment to shore up their financial losses. One of the most recent
examples in North Texas is the City of Hurst's condemnation and redevelopment of neighborhood property to expand a shopping mall,8"
discussed in greater detail below.
75. See The Brookings Institution, Event Summary: The 2004 Election Results,
Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/op-ed/20041105results.htm (referencing volume of voters, the article states that "[o]ne of the highlights of the election was
the near-historic number of voters who arrived at the polls, motivated by the belief
that this election would decide the direction of the United States and energized by
massive get-out-the-vote efforts.").
76. Federal Election Commission, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections:
1960-1996, http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
77. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
78. Id.
79. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CITIES WITH 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION IN 2000
RANKED BY POPULATION: PERCENT CHANGE, 1990-2000 IN RANK ORDER, http://
www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/citllOOr.txt (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
80. See supra text accompanying note 68.
81. See Richmond, supra note 61, at 331 ("[Mlajor cities are surrounded by seas of
low density residential development, highlighted by 'agglomerations' of development,
often referred to as 'Edge Cities' or 'suburban megacenters,' where commercial, retail, office, and entertainment development has occurred.").
82. See Kendall Anderson, Judge Rules Hurst Can Take Properties:Landowners
have Sued to Stop Seizure for Mall Expansion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 23,
1997, at 6N.
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Voter Participationin Texas

Texas has followed the national trend in decline in voter participation.8 3 Participation in national issues (i.e., presidential election years)
is almost always higher, while voting on Texas constitutional issues
tends to fluctuate.84 For example, in the presidential election years,
from 1972-2000, an average of 69% of the voting age population
(VAP)85 was registered to vote, with an average of 67% of registered
voters turning out to vote.8 6 This is in contrast to non-presidential
election years, from 1970-2002, in which an average of 66% of the
VAP was registered
to vote, while an average of 43.7% of registered
87
voters turned out.
Texas constitutional issues, from 1977-2001, drew an average of
13% of registered voters, while over that same time period, an average of 68% of the VAP was registered.88 Interestingly, 1987 was the
peak year for voter turnout, at 30.56%.89 This was the year that Texans voted on an amendment to the Texas Constitution, discussed in
greater detail below, to include economic development as a public
purpose for public fund expenditure purposes. 90
C.

Current "Public Use" Interpretations

While taking private property for a private purpose has generally
been accepted as unconstitutional,9 1 the concept of "public use" has
expanded such that today, "[p]ractically any acquisition meets the
public use test if it serves a public purpose, confers a benefit on the
public, or furthers the state's police powers."9 2 The ambiguity of
"public use" allows for an interpretive spectrum, with extremes on either side. As one court has noted,
[A]ny attempt at a concise and comprehensive definition of "public
use" would be unsuccessful. Only by the gradual process of judicial
83. See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 75-76.

84. TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, TURNOUT AND VOTER REGISTRATION FIGURES
(1970-CURRENT), http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
85. See Federal Election Commission, A Few Words About Voting Age Population (VAP), http://www.fec.gov/pages/vapwords.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). "The
term Voting Age Population (VAP), refers to the total number of persons in the
United States who are 18 years of age or older regardless of citizenship, military status, felony conviction, or mental state. The standard source of VAP figures is the
Bureau of the Census, as reported in their Current Population Reports, Series P-25."
Id.
86. See TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 84.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See infra Part II.C.2.
91. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01[1] (3d ed.

2005).

92. Id. § 7.01[1].
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exclusion and inclusion, and by a study of the influences which have
affected the development of the law in the area under consideration, can any authoritative delimitation of "public use" be attained.
Among these influences, one of the most significant is the historical
development of public use and the forces-economic, social, and
political-which have affected it.93
1.

Federal Interpretation of "Public Use"

The U.S. Supreme Court has tended to take the "broad" view in
interpretation of "public use," 94 illustrated most recently in its Kelo
decision.95 "Blight" as a reason for taking property for redevelop97
96 In Berman v. Parker,
ment falls under this broad categorization.
the Court upheld the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945, which allowed the use of eminent domain to redevelop slum areas, as promoting a "public use." 9 8 The Court interpreted the use of
eminent domain as turning on a rule of reason, stating that the use of
the eminent domain power is "essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes
neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition," 99
even if this meant, as part of the "comprehensive" redevelopment to
eliminate blight, that non-blighted property could also be taken, and
resold to private interests. 10 0
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,1° in which the Hawaiian
legislature passed a statute allowing the property to be taken from the
landlord-owners and resold to the tenants in fee simple, the Court
stated that the "mere fact that property taken outright by eminent
domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does
not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose."1 2 This
echoed the much-earlier Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles"°3 decision, in
which the Court stated that "[i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion,... directly enjoy or par93. County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 114 A.2d 461, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955).
94. See cases cited infra Part II.C.1.
95. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). The Court examined
"over a century" of its precedents regarding the Fifth Amendment "public use" provision in the development of the Kelo opinion. See id. at 2668.
96. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306-07 (2004)
(renaming an area "blighted" gives a freedom to redevelop an area in the image it
believes "it should be").
97. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
98. See id. at 31.
99. Id. at 32.
100. See id. at 34-35.
101. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 229.
102. Id. at 243-44.
103. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
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ticipate
,,lo4 in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public
use.

Most recently, the Court granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New
London,"°5 to address this specific issue of economic development and
eminent domain: What protection does the Fifth Amendment's public
use requirement provide for individuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but for the sole purpose of
''economic development" that will perhaps increase tax revenues and
improve the local economy? 10 6 Based on the facts and circumstances
of that case, the Court concluded that New London's use of eminent
domain for economic development was constitutional. 7
Kelo originated as a mammoth opinion by the Connecticut Supreme
Court, upholding the constitutionality of using economic development
as a public purpose.' 0 The justification for this holding was primarily
based upon the facts that the plan at issue, paralleling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,109 discussed below, was "projected
to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues,
and to revitalize an economically distressed city . . .""I Connecticut
historically took the broad approach to "public use,"' and its high
court reasoned in Kelo that the creation of "public economic benefits"
satisfied the state and federal constitutions' "public use" clauses." 2
One of the key facts upon which the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent
ruling turned was that Connecticut had a statute "express[ing] a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as
part of an economic development project is a 'public use'....,l 3 The
U.S. Supreme Court stated:
Given the comprehensive character of the [economic rejuvenation] plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and
the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in
104. Id. at 707.
105. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
106. Kelo v. City of New London, Question Presented, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/qp/04-00108qp.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
107. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668.
108. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507-08 (Conn.), cert. granted,
542 U.S. 965 (2004).
109. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004).
110. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 507.
111. See id. at 522 (citing Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 546 (1866), which held
that mill improvements that would result in flooding neighboring land were permitted
as generally useful to the public who relied on the mill's production). The Olmstead
court construed "public use" as "synonymous with public benefit or advantage," and
held that "any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of eminent domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public
use." Id. at 522 n.31.
112. See id. at 520.
113. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).
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Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a
piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that
plan unquestioningly serves a public purpose, the takings challenged
here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 4
Underlying all of these decisions is the idea that courts should defer
15
to federal or state legislative determinations of public interest,'
under a rational basis-type review.1 16 The eminent domain power has
been treated as a means to an end,' 17 and success
in achieving the
11 8
intended goal of the legislation is not required.
Of significance to the overall body of jurisprudence dealing with
economic development and eminent domain is another state court
case dealing with similar facts, but which did not reach the U.S. Supreme Court. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,119
the Michigan Supreme Court approved Detroit's use of eminent domain for economic development, to condemn private property on behalf of General Motors Corp. for construction of a new automobile
assembly plant. 2 ° Under the philosophy that when there is a public
need, "'[tlhe abstract right [of an individual] to make use of his own
property in his own way is compelled to yield to the general comfort
and protection of the community, and to a proper regard to relative
rights in others[ ],"' the majority held the public benefit sufficient "to
satisfy this Court that such a project was an intended and a legitimate
object of the Legislature when it allowed municipalities to exercise,
condemnation powers even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident thereto."''
One of the dissenting justices pointed out that in exchange for the estimated 6,150
114. Id. at 2665.
115. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (explaining "... when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation ....").See also United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d
1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1970) ("It is perfectly clear that the judicial role in examining
condemnation cases does not extend to determining whether the land sought is actually necessary for the operation of the project.").
116. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (Regulation as a
"comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure.").
"[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause." Id. at 241.
117. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (stating that "the power of eminent domain is merely
the means to the end").
118. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)).
119. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004).
120. See id. at 458-60.
121. Id. at 459.
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jobs to be created at the GM plant, 3,438 people would be displaced,
and 1,176 structures destroyed.122
Poletown was recently reversed in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,2 3
wherein the Michigan Supreme Court recanted its earlier justification
of economic development as a public purpose, stating that "a vague
economic benefit stemming from a private profit-maximizing enterprise," is not 1a24 public use after all, citing to the Poletown dissent by
Justice Ryan.
2.

Texas Interpretation of "Public Use"

Texas's interpretation of "public use" as it pertains to economic development must be examined chronologically because of an amendment to the Texas Constitution in 1987 that pertained specifically to
economic development. 2 5 The Texas Constitution prohibited public
fund expenditures for promotion of private business activity'2 6 until
November 1987, when Texas voters passed an amendment to the
Texas Constitution that provided expenditures for economic development serve a public purpose. 12 7 The Texas Constitution, Article III,
section 52-a now states that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the legislature may provide for the creation of programs and the making of
loans and grants of public money, other than money otherwise dedicated by this constitution to use for a different purpose, for the public purposes of development and diversificationof the economy of the
state, the elimination of unemployment or underemployment in the
state, the stimulation of agriculturalinnovation, the fostering of the
growth of enterprises based on agriculture,or the development or expansion of transportationor commerce in the state. Any bonds or
other obligations of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state that are issued for the purpose of making loans or
grants in connection with a program authorized by the legislature
under this section and that are payable from ad valorem taxes must
be approved by a vote of the majority of the registered voters of the
county, municipality, or political subdivision voting on the
issue....128
This change made possible subsequent legislation dealing with municipal economic development.2 9 Although the amendment provides a
122. See id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
123. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
124. Id. at 786. "[W]e conclude that the transfer of condemned property is a 'public use' when it possess[es] one of the three characteristics in our pre-1963 case law
identified by Justice Ryan." Id. at 781.
125. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a.
126. See TEX. CONST. art. II1, § 52.
127. See TEX. CoNsT. art. III, § 52-a.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 380.001 (Vernon 2005) (defining miscellaneous provisions relating to municipal planning and development of economic
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requirement for voter approval, as discussed above, voter participation in Texas has declined significantly over the past three decades.13 °
Voter participation on this issue, however, was the high point for
Texas voter turnout on
constitutional issues, with 30.56% of registered
31
voters participating.1
a.

Texas JudicialInterpretation,pre-1987

In 1940, the Texas Supreme Court held in Housing Authority of City
of Dallas v. Higginbotham'3 2 that a taking for public use depends on
the character of the public use, not its extent, and just because "the
advantage of the use inures to a particular individual or enterprise,1 ' or
33
group thereof, will not deprive [the use] of its public character.
Higginbotham involved slum clearance, and followed the majority of
states and the federal government in holding that the eradication of
blight was a public purpose sufficient for the use of eminent domain, 34 even though officially, Texas courts
purported to follow the
"narrow" interpretation of "public use. '1 35
A subsequent case, Davis v. City of Lubbock, 136 involved a similar
issue, holding constitutional the Texas Urban Renewal Law, which
provided that blight clearance and resale of condemned property
served a "public use" when "subject to such covenants, restrictions
and zoning restrictions as will insure that the redevelopment plan will
be carried out and that the property will not again become a slum or
blight area within the foreseeable future .... ,,13' The court approved
the condemnation as for a public purpose.138 Of particular note in
Davis is the additional protection provided by the Texas legislature in
passing the Texas Urban Renewal Law, which the court noted contained "more limitations upon the powers of cities and renewal agencies than are contained in the laws of other states.' 1 39 The court cited
as an example the requirement that to exercise the powers, the city
development programs). Section 380.001(a) provides that the municipality may provide for program administration, including "programs for making loans and grants of
public money ... to promote state or local economic development and to stimulate
business and commercial activity in the municipality." Id. (emphasis added).
130. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
131. TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 84.
132. Hous. Auth. of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1940).
133. Id. at 84.
134. See id. at 85.
135. See Benbow, supra note 56, at 1500 (stating "courts' struggles to reconcile the
state's expanding role in fostering public welfare with the narrow traditional construction of [public use]").
136. Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1959).
137. Id. at 707. "The general purpose of the Urban Renewal Law is to provide for
the clearance of slum and blighted areas in cities and the redevelopment of the areas
by private enterprise under restrictions designed to carry out the plan of renewal and
to prevent recurrence of the slum conditions." Id. at 701.
138. See id. at 707.
139. Id.
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council must first hold "an election by the people of the city as to
whether (1) one or more slum or blighted areas exist in such cities,
and (2) slum clearance and rehabilitation of such area is14necessary
in
0
the interest of public health, safety, morals or welfare.
Other, fairly typical, public purposes included condemnation for
"public roads, parks, schools, railways, sanitation, drainage, flood control, telephone and telegraph facilities, light and power facilities, irri' 141
gation, port facilities, urban renewal, and public housing."
However, the Texas courts continued to adhere, in theory, to a narrow
view of "public use." As one commentator noted,
[t]he administrative necessity of delegating the power of eminent
domain to both public and private corporate entities to facilitate
regional development soon gave rise to anomalous situations
wherein the exercise of the delegated power appeared to vest in the
general public little more than a fictional right of use, while "inci142
dental" private gain to the condemning authority was substantial.
In Maher v. Lasater,143 the Texas Supreme Court held that while legislative declarations of public use "will be given great weight by the
courts, the ultimate question of whether a particular use is a public use
is a judicial question to be decided by the courts.""' Maher and similar private-access cases belie the tacit approval of projects involving
the broad construction of "public use," because Maher's sole issue was
restricted to a "private landowner's right to an easement of necessity
over adjacent private property .... ."145
The trend, even before the modification of the Texas Constitution,
had been to permit eminent domain use for industrial development, so
long as it related to other recognized public uses, 1 46 in addition to the
assertion that a legislative declaration of public use "is binding on the
court unless it is manifestly wrong or unreasonable," or its purpose is
148
clearly private. 14 7 In Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District,
140. Id. at 701.
141. Benbow, supra note 56, at 1510-11.
142. Id. at 1500 n.10. He also noted, in reference to early 1900s cases, that "[a]fter
initially adopting a comparatively restrictive definition of public use, the Texas courts,
in order to stay apace of the rapidly changing social and economic climate, soon found
themselves in the unenviable position of honoring the inflexible 'use by the public'
concept more in the breach than in the application." Id. at 1504.
143. Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1962).
144. Id. at 925. The court held that landlocked property owner was not entitled to
what amounted to an easement across neighboring property by eminent domain, and
that the legislative act at issue was void. See id. at 926. Of particular relevance to the
court was the fact that no one lived on this land and it was used for pasture. See id. at
924.
145. Benbow, supra note 56, at 1509 (citing Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
1962)).
146. See Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer, 653 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. App.Corpus Christie 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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landowners protested the condemnation of 1,760 acres of their land by
the district for the purpose of port and industrial facility construction,
statutorily authorized as a "public purpose and a matter of public necessity. ' 149 The court considered this direct legislative declaration, as
well as the circumstances, and concluded that, "a matter of common
knowledge," because industrial development and successful port operation "go hand in hand" as essential to one another, that the public
use requirement was satisfied.1 5 °
b.

Texas Judicial Interpretation,post-1987

Since the modification of the Texas Constitution, the specific issue
of economic development as a public purpose has not yet been addressed by the Texas Supreme Court. In City of Arlington v. Golddust
Twins Realty Corp., 5 ' the Fifth Circuit noted that although Texas still
counted itself as adopting the narrow view of "public purpose," this
interpretation has continued to be honored more in breach than in
practice.1 52 Deference to the legislature remains strong in Texas
courts:
In light of more recent opinions articulating the role of legislatures
and the judiciary in determining whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised for public purposes, we believe the proper
view is to defer to the legislature's declaration 1of
53 a public purpose,
unless the purpose is clearly private in nature.
The Texas Office of the Attorney General also examined the issue
of taking private property for the economic development as a public
purpose, and stated that while "[e]conomic development itself is not
one of the listed purposes" under Chapter 273 of the Texas Local
Government Code's list of purposes under which a city may purchase
land,' 54 Chapter 251 of the same code "appears to provide independent authority for a city to use its powers of eminent domain."' 5 5 One
of the purposes under that chapter allows a city to use eminent domain when it "considers it necessary.., for any... municipal purpose
the governing body considers advisable."' 5 6 The Attorney General
stated:
148. Atwood, 271 S.W.2d at 137.
149. Id. at 139-40 (internal citations removed).
150. Id. at 142. "We hold that the acquisition of lands for industrial development
by a navigation district is for a public use, and that the amendment of 1947, Article
8263h, § 50, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Stats., is constitutional." Id. at 143.
151. City of Arlington v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. See id. at 965-66.
153. Tex. Fruit Palace, Inc. v. City of Palestine, 842 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. App.Tyler 1992, writ denied).
154. ECONoMic DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 150, available at http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/AGPublications/pdfs/2004econdevhb.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) [hereinaf-

ter

HANDBOOK].

155. Id. at 151.
156. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 251.001(a)(5) (Vernon 2005).
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A strong argument can be made that the use of land for economic
development would constitute a municipal purpose since both the
Texas Constitution and state statutory law have been amended to
make economic development a permissible public purpose. Additionally, Texas Civil Statutes Article 5190.6, Sections 4A(g) and
4B(j) provide economic development corporations organized under
Sections 4A or 4B with the power of eminent domain if approved
by the involved city. Since the overriding purpose of Section 4A
and Section 4B corporations is to promote economic development,
it appears that the Legislature interpreted a city's power of eminent
domain to include the authority
to condemn land for purposes of
157
economic development.
One counter-argument cited by the Attorney General to assist cities
in risk assessment is that because "eminent domain laws predate the
constitutional amendment on economic development," they could not
be considered "implementing legislation for the use of eminent do'
main to acquire property for economic development purposes. 158
Also, if a city were to use eminent domain for economic development
by condemnation on behalf of a private entity, then it "would arguably need to receive from that entity some sort of legally enforceable
promise to accomplish a permissible economic development purpose."15' 9 With the idea of this power in mind, one should then consider potential limitations on the use of that power. Most recently,
160
Texas legislative enactments now place limits on such use.
D. Non-Legislative Limitations on Takings for
Economic Development
1. Administrative "Due Process" Factors
"Administrative" costs associated with the use of eminent domain
include obtaining legislative authorization or persuading officials to
exercise such authorization,1 6 1 procedural requirements imposed by
the federal constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses, as well as state constitutional and statutory requirements,
professional appraisal of the property to be condemned, and court
costs,16 2 in addition to the actual required amount of "just," or "ade-

quate," compensation.
157.

HANDBOOK,

63

Merrill states that "[t]he possibility of trial

supra note 154, at 151.

158. Id.
159. Id. See also Attorney General's Municipal Advisory Committee, 2004 Eminent Domain Made Easy: Answers to the Most Frequently Asked Questions About
Eminent Domain, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG-Publications/pdfs/2004eminentdomaineasy.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
160. See infra Part IV.C.
161. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 77 (1986).
162. See id.
163. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) ("The rights of these property
owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.4

20

Askew:
Take It or Leave
It: Eminent
Domain for Economic
Development-Stat543
DEVELOPMENT
2006]
EMINENT
DOMAIN
& ECONOMIC

clearly increases the expected administrative costs of condemnation"

and, with the other costs associated with due process, make eminent
domain a more expensive way of acquiring resources in what he refers
to as a "thick market."'1 64 Another commentator, testing Merrill's ec-

onomics-based eminent domain theory, also concludes that "[f]or the
most part, municipalities avoid condemning private property unless

market conditions require them to do so.' 1 6 5 Another factor that may
have an impact is the "public relations" factor: a city that institutes a

a trier of fact who will
condemnation case "must face at the outset
1 66
generally perceive [it] in a negative light.'
2.

Site Selection

Generally, neighborhoods are unlikely to be taken for economic development unless there is a severe shortage of available land for development. In addition to the various factors listed in business

relocation and expansion decisions above, the first stage in the land
development (or redevelopment) process involves site inspection, preliminary market study, and preliminary cost estimates. 1 67 Even if the

site is a greenfield (i.e., has not had prior development), this initial
evaluation may still derail the project if the area itself is not suitable
for the particular development envisioned. 68 If the site has been previously developed, or even worse, has acquired the designation
"brownfield,"169 this may further complicate any chances of
redevelopment.
Considering these factors, as well as the statistics discussed above,
one may conclude that in an urbanized area, the risk of a taking for
economic development purposes is increased, but not epidemic. As a
Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."); U.S. CONST. amend. V; see TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 17.
164. See Merrill, supra note 161, at 76-77 (characterizing "any situation where market conditions do not allow a seller to extract economic rents from a buyer [as] a
'thick market'").
165. Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings
and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 274 (2004).
166. Snyder, supra note 39, at 649.
167. See WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FiNANCE AND INVESTMENTS 529 (10th ed. 1997). For example, with a greenfield site,
before any development can take place, it must be studied "to establish how much of
the surface area needs excavating and grading, and at what cost. These decisions are a
function of the topography, drainage characteristics, soil condition, and subsurface
characteristics." Id.
168. See id.
169. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields Cleanup & Redevelopment, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). A
brownfield is "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. Cleaning up and reinvesting in these properties takes development pressures off of undeveloped, open land, and both improves and protects the
environment." Id.
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witness from the real estate planning and economic development consulting firm explained to the trial court in Kelo, the "common redevelopment approach" is to give the private sector developer "raw land
with the necessary infrastructure, and the developer makes an investment."' 7 ° However, the risk is higher for the private developer if the
site has hazardous waste, geographic constraint, "a lot of regulations
dealing with it, and it's in an urban setting ... [t]hat's not the most
attractive for investment., 171 In spite of that, the fact that it can occur
is still cause for concern when considered in the context of the constitutional imbalance created when the courts give excessive deference
1 72
to the legislature, and voters fail to supervise their legislators.
3.

North Texas Examples

Hurst, Texas, is a classic example of an inner-ring city, geographically encircled by highways 121, 183, and 10.173 In 1997, the North
East Mall, Hurst's biggest taxpayer, and employment site of over
2,600 workers, discussed the possibility of a $220 million expansion,
predicted to result in an additional $8 million in sales taxes and 2,000
more jobs. 174 The hitch was that plan implementation would require a
buyout of 127 homeowners, to facilitate road and parking lot expansion. 7 5 Only ten homeowners refused to accept the buyout offered by
the mall's owner. 1 76 In 2000, the City of Hurst settled with the ten
hold-outs for $3 million. 7 7 North East Mall remains Hurst's largest
employment site,
with 3,460 workers employed in its various retail
78
establishments.
Eminent domain for economic development is not a recent phenomenon in North Texas-in the 1960s, over 200 Dallasites lost their
homes to an expansion of Fair Park, "to provide more parking spaces
for the Dallas Cowboys . . . ."19 Other examples have included condemnation by the City of Arlington for The Ballpark in Arlington
170. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 554 n.82 (Conn. 2004), cert.
granted, 542 U.S. 965 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108).

171. Id.
172. See infra Parts III, IV.
173. For a visual description of Hurst's geographical layout see North Central Texas
Council of Governments, http://www.dfwmaps.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
174. Growing Pains: Mall's Expansion Claims Neighborhood, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS,

Feb. 1, 1998, at 9A.

175. See id.
176. See id. The buyout package amounted to an average of 180% of the properties' values. See id.
177. See Scott Stafford, Private Sector Sites Eyed: Planned DART Stations Have

City Rethinking Eminent Domain Rules,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Dec. 5, 2003, at

10.
178. See North Central Texas Council of Governments, 2004 Major Employer Publication, http://www.nctcog.org/ris/majemp/majempbycity04.pdf (last visited Nov. 28,
2004).
179. Frank Trejo, Bitter Legacy at Fair Park: 1960s Controversy Recalled as Talk

Grows of Possible Cowboys' Return, DALLAS MORNING
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.4

NEWS,

Apr. 4, 2004, at lB.
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(now Ameriquest Field in Arlington), and by the City of Fort Worth

for the Texas Motor Speedway. 181 Most recently, debate has centered

over the new $650 million Dallas Cowboys stadium, 181 which recently
passed a vote in Arlington: 55.27% for and 44.73% against. 182 How-

ever, there appears to be less concern about home loss and more conprice, required by the Texas
cern that the "adequate compensation"
183
Constitution, be sufficient.
III.

FACTOR INTERPLAY LEADING TO
CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE

The ambiguity inherent in "public use" allows for the interpretive
spectrum addressed above. Today, it can be construed to mean almost
anything and courts tend not only to defer to the legislature, but also
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in doing so.
The Founders of the Constitution envisioned an institutional framework of limited government to secure private property rights,'184 but
anticipated that an active public would keep legislative officials in
check not an apathetic civic body. 185 Until the 2004 presidential election,18 6 voter registration and participation had been on a decline, 8 7
with a corresponding negative effect on keeping the legislature in
check. 88 Candidates for all levels of political office promote the plat180. See Kendall Anderson, Bedford to Vote on Eminent Domain: Plan Would Bar
Takeover of Property for Private Use, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 1997, at 1G.
181. See Jim Getz, Arlington Council to Vote on Stadium: City, Cowboys Reach
Tentative Deal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 17, 2004, at lB.
182. City of Arlington, City Election, Nov. 2, 2004, Dallas Cowboys Complex Project Election Results, http://www.ci.arlington.tx.us/citysecretary/110204_election
results.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
183. See Jim Getz, "Right Price" Would Clear Way for Stadium, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 22, 2004, at lA. One resident stated, "We could be out in seven days. But
if they don't offer the right price, we'll hold it up all the way." Id. The stadium
project has not been derailed despite recent changes in Texas law, and "despite homeowner objections that they are being displaced for economic benefit, not public use."
Levy, supra note 15, at 4B.
184. See ELY, supra note 19, at 4 ("The bicameral legislative body, an independent
judiciary, and the other checks and balances established by the Constitution were
expected to create a political climate in which property interests would be safe.").
185. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (stating the idea that
factions were a part of American political life); The Constitution Society, Chronology
of the Pro- and Anti-Federalist Papers and how they related to one another and to
key events, http://www.constitution.org/afp/afpchron.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006)
(providing a detailed timeline of events related to the drafting of the Federalist
Papers).
186. See The Brookings Institution, supra note 75.
187. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, supra note 76.
188. SCHULTZ, supra note 13, at 3 ("The state of property rights and legislative
power in America . . . may stand at a conceptual crossroads, in need of
reexamination.").
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form of "economic development, 189 or at least receive funding for
19° And an increasingly urban
it.
population has abdicated its responsibility not to "sleep on its [private property] rights,"' 191 in decreased
voter registration and participation in the political process. 92 This, in
turn, has resulted in a constitutional imbalance at both federal and
state levels, because without the public or judiciary to keep legislative

power in check, lawmakers have free rein.
With regard to the hypothetical situation in the introduction, Big
Corporation might bypass the North Texas City, denying it an opportunity to increase the tax base and develop those jobs. This is be-

cause, in addition to the cost of using eminent domain and the specific
site selection factors involved in a corporate location decision, Texas
has redrawn a line regarding "public use," in response to the political
backlash following Kelo. 193

The previous line existed because of the importance of jobs, taxes,
and geography, in addition to the constitutional asymmetry caused by
judicial deference and voter abdication. But until recently, the "public use" determination of economic development remained a rule of
reason to be determined locally. Determining where an individual's
right to private property should end in the face of socioeconomic expansion, when the cost is potential home loss to citizens and a litigation black-eye to city councils, is essentially a local decision.
However, Texas legislators responded to Kelo by enacting a law that,

while protecting private property rights to a certain extent, may hamper local communities' flexibility in responding to some economic development opportunities, because of its emphasis on denying a taking
that "confers a private benefit on a particularprivate party,"1'94 which

189. See Weber, supra note 20, at 101 ("Deals that attract or retain large companies
announced with great fanfare as politicians rush to take credit for reviving the
local economy.").
190. See, e.g., Texas Economic Development Council, The TEDC PAC: Your Voice
at the Texas Capitol, http://www.texasedc.org/docs/116-2005tedc brochure -v2.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2006). TEDC PAC was organized in 1997 to "represent[ ] the
interests of more than 900 economic developers from across Texas." Id.
191. See generally 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 91.01[4] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (supporting the idea that one of the policies
behind adverse possession is to punish owners who fail to defend their property rights
within the statutory period); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 589
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that "[t]akings for
private economic development resemble takings by adverse possession because property owners in both situations lose title to their land").
192. See supra Part II.B.1, B.2.b.
193. See Levy, supra note 15, at 4B.
194. See TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). Specifically, the legislature indicated that its reason for proposing this statute
was to redefine the scope of public use in light of Kelo. Sen. Comm. on Land and
Resource Management, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d C.S. (2005).
...are
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would include Big Corporation, in spite of any195public benefits bestowed by the proposed economic development.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Current safety measures for individual landowners include the site
selection factors, geographic layout of the area in question, the administrative "due process" costs of using eminent domain,19 6 the statutory
requirements that must be met to condemn property for public use
involved, and the requirement of payment of "just" or "adequate"
compensation. 9 7 These measures combine to make it an unusual situation when someone's home is actually taken for economic development purposes. However, the problem remains that in certain
circumstances, someone's private property could be taken for economic development purposes, despite new statutory provisions. The
risk may be minimal in many circumstances, but that does not give the
homeowner an excuse to "sleep on his rights" and fail to make his or
her voice heard at city hall. The various alternatives discussed below
have been proposed by a number of commentators and include constitutional, judicial, and legislative changes, to increase individual
protection.
A.

Constitutional Change

Some commentators have suggested that a change in state constitutions to make use of eminent domain more difficult is the solution to
the problem of takings for economic development purposes.1 98 Specifically, by raising the "information and transaction costs" to interest
groups of using eminent domain to take private property for private
purposes, "economically rational special interest will find rent-seeking
195. However, the statute itself is riddled with exceptions, including one that prohibits a taking for economic development purposes, "unless the economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development or
municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas" under the existing Local Government and Tax
Codes. § 2206.001(b)(3). The "slum and blight" clearance theories for enacting a taking have been used to justify a taking for what amounts to economic development
purposes since at least Berman v. Parker. See supra Part II.C.1.
196. See Merrill, supra note 161, at 77.
197. See supra Part II.
198. See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest Group Perspective, 3 TEX. Rnv. L. & POL. 49, 92 (1998) (stating
that the "[g]ame theory and the classic prisoner's dilemma illustrate that no one faction will find it in their best interest to unilaterally withdraw from the political game
of rent-seeking"); see also ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 263 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that "[ilf judges remain fixed in their ways,
then perhaps some constitutional revisions might be in order"). Recent passage of
the Texas statute to prevent takings for economic development dissatisfied some critics, who "wanted a constitutional amendment instead of a law, to avoid any loopholes." Levy, supra note 15, at 4B.
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too expensive."1 99 However, eminent domain itself is not the root
problem, and states and cities still need that power in order to facilitate its traditional uses, such as road expansion.2 00 Also, in Texas at

least, constitutional change is a possibility, but appears unlikely, because the majority (or at least those who vote) have demonstrated a
preference for flexibility when it comes to economic development. 0
B.

Judicial Change

Other commentators suggest that it is the courts' responsibility to
protect private property rights.2 12 Specifically, because courts have
performed the guardianship role in terms of civil rights, they should

also exercise this activism to protect property rights, standing as "the
final bulwark against government's propensity to seek the public good

at the expense of trenching upon property rights[.] '' 2°3 A subissue is
the concern that allowing private property to be taken for economic
development may also reduce other rights, if private property ownership has historically been considered a buffer from government
coercion.2 °4

Based on the current "ends justify the means" analysis, reconfirmed

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo,20 5 legislative discretion is the key

to resolution of a condemnation for economic development as a pub-

lic purpose. 20 6 This means that just about anything goes-unless the
taking is clearly arbitrary or capricious-and as long as it has been
thoroughly covered by a statute, it will probably pass federal constitu-

tional muster. To be found arbitrary or capricious today, "[t]here
must be basic to the project pervasive deception, unreasoned decision,
or will-of-the-wisp determination before these words of pejoration are
brought into play."2 7 And as more than one commentator has noted,
courts do not have the same access to experts, or need to assess, when
a particular property is required for public use.20 8 One commentator
has stated that:
199. Kochan, supra note 198, at 92.
200. See generally Attorney General's Municipal Advisory Committee, supra note
159 (providing background information on eminent domain).
201. See supra Part II.C.2. That is, as long as it's not their house being taken.
202. See Paul, supra note 198, at 266.
203. Id. (stating "[i]n recent times we have seen activist judges in effect usurp legislative or executive functions by themselves managing schools, mental hospitals, and
prisons").
204. See ELY, supra note 19, at 43.
205. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
206. See United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir.
1970) ("Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to
complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.").
207. Id. at 1290.
208. See Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REV. 783, 800 (1999) ("It is both difficult and costly
for courts to complete an independent analysis of a societal or public benefit. It is
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[i]n light of the multitudinous variables inherent in public planning
which are peculiarly within the realm of administrative expertise,
the courts are simply not the proper bodies, in the absence of extreme arbitrariness or fraud, to make a satisfactory determination of
the expediency of a specific use, the necessity of a particular taking,
or the extent of the interest to be acquired.
Courts are also not immune to socioeconomic factors that may promote infringement on private property rights. Cases like Poletown
demonstrate "how easily government, in all of its branches, caught up
in the frenzy of perceived economic crisis, can disregard the rights of
the few in allegiance to the always disastrous philosophy that the end
justifies the means. '2 1° This is why some commentators suggest that
judicial review should be of the means used, and not the "public purpose" ends. 1 1 In light of decisions like Poletown, and now Kelo, judicial redevelopment of the takings framework has been urged. 1 2
Recommendations have included strict scrutiny and demonstration of
compelling state need where certain conditions are present, including
where "the land is transferred to another private party rather than
held by the public; [ ] the individual interest of those whose land is
taken is particularly strong and monetary compensation cannot significantly compensate for the loss; and []the party whose land is taken is
relatively powerless politically."2 '1 3
Courts have made difficult land rights determinations before, with
acknowledgment as early as Blackstone that "in short, one's absolute
rights to property are tempered by the rights of others or by the public
difficult because determining the societal costs and benefits of any taking is at best
uncertain and speculative. It is costly because it requires courts to review all of the
evidence presented and determine if, in fact, the taking is in the interests of the
public.").
209. Benbow, supra note 56, at 1503.
210. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465
(Mich. 1981) (per curiam) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
211. See Merrill, supra note 161, at 71 (stating that "the American judiciary is unlikely soon to assume the task of closely scrutinizing legislative judgments about the
legitimate ends of government"). "Given the choice of means question is an analytically distinct and important inquiry, it is worth asking whether the public use limitation can be reformulated as a choice of means doctrine, and if so, whether the
judiciary should have a role in reviewing the exercise of eminent domain from this
perspective." Id.
212. See Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in
Order to Effectuate a "Public-PrivateTaking" -a Proposalto Redefine "Public Use,"
2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 639, 660-61 (2000) (Five reasons why Poletown is bad law:
loss of individual liberty and less private property protection, imposition of significant
costs on society through economic inefficiency, encourages interest group capture, too
much deference to legislative determination of public use, and "creates new constitutional rules beyond the traditional scope of the eminent domain limitation in the
Constitution.").
213. Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L.
REv. 207, 224 (2004).
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good,' 21 4 and that there is an interaction between property's legal nature and "how the law could alter property relations."2 1' 5 Specifically,
common law creations in property law like trespass, nuisance, and
water law, traditionally allowed courts "to bend the law to keep up
with shifting communal values. '2 16 The policy that "[p]roperty rights
serve human values" and "are recognized to that end and are limited
by it," 21 7 has been used in various courts over the years to justify entry
onto another's land because of necessity,21 8 civil rights legislation for219
limbidding various forms of discrimination on the right to exclude,

itations on landlords with regard to tenants' rights, 220 and other
restrictions on the absolute right of the private property owner. In
redrawing the line, courts must reflect that while today's society is
willing to protect private property to a certain extent,
an owner must expect to find the absoluteness of his property rights
curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate as protective
agencies. The necessity for such curtailments is greater in a modern
industrialized and urbanized society than it was in the relatively
simple American society of fifty, 100, or 200 years ago. The current
balance between individualism and dominance of the social interest
depends not only upon political and social ideologies, but also upon
the physical and social facts of the time and place under
discussion.22 1
At this time, however, in the shadows of Kelo, Berman, and Midkiff,
judicial change appears unlikely.
C.

Legislative Change

For Texas, legislative change appears to be the most reasonable solution to minimize the risks associated with taking private property for
economic development purposes, but the critical factor is at which
level: state or local?
The most recent statutory enactment, Limitation on Eminent Domain for Private Parties or Economic Development Purposes,2
214.

SCHULTZ,

supra note 13, at 20 (citing 2

LAWS OF ENGLAND

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE

§ 2).

215. Id.
216. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 103 (1995).
217. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
218. See id. at 372-75 (establishing a public policy limitation on right to exclude
when landowner kept migrant farm workers from receiving government information).
219. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discussing
whether the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is valid
under the Commerce Clause).
220. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984).
221. 10 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 69.01 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2000).
222. TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon Supp. 2005).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.4

28

Askew:
Take It or Leave
It: Eminent
Domain for Economic
Development-Stat
551
& ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
2006]
EMINENT
DOMAIN

grandfathers Arlington's new Dallas Cowboys stadium project,2 23 and
leaves open takings for transportation projects, port authorities, and
other special groups 224 that, per Texas jurisprudential history, have
traditionally been allowed to use eminent domain for purposes that
tend to result in economic development.2 2 5 It also leaves open takings
to redevelop blighted areas.22 6
At the local level, some North Texas cities took action before the
Kelo decision. For example, in 1997, as a reaction to the Hurst-mall
scenario described above, the neighboring City of Bedford held a referendum to amend the city ordinances to include that while the city
followed the state law as it pertained to municipal eminent domain
power:
[n]othing included ... anywhere within this charter shall authorize
the city, or any corporation, agency or entity created by the city, or
pursuant to the city's approval and authorization, to institute and
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire private or public
property if the purpose of the acquistion is the promotion of economic development for a private business enterprise which business
enterprise would own any right, title, or interest in the property so
acquired.22 7
Another neighboring city, Carrollton, added a substantially similar
provision in 1998.228 This local action adds a "brighter" line, directly
accountable to the homeowners within the community, and unlike a
statute, is easier to amend if the community's citizens change their
minds.
Other recommendations based on case law and commentators, to
modify either state or local requirements for a taking for economic
development purposes include incorporating three key elements: extreme public necessity, continuing public accountability, and selection
of land according to facts of independent significance.2 2 9 Or, categorizing property as "political" and "non-political," to determine what
223. See id. § 2206.001(c)(6).
224. See id. § 2206.001(c)(1)-(11).
225. See supra Part II.C.
226. See § 2206.001(b)(3).
227. BEDFORD, TEX., ORDINANCES ART. 1, § 1.08(b), available at http://www.
municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=11924&sid=43 (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
228. CARROLLTON, TEX., CODE art. I, § 1.04 (2005) ("Provided, however, nothing
included above or anywhere in this charter shall authorize the City of Carrollton, or
any corporations, agency or entity created by the City, or pursuant to the City's approval and authorization, to institute and exercise the power of eminent domain to
acquire private or public property if the purpose of the acquisition is the promotion of
economic development for a private business enterprise which business enterprise
would own any right, title, or interest in the property so acquired.), availableat http://
www.ci.carrollton.tx.us/government/code of-ordinances.shtml and http://www.
municode.com.
229. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478
(Mich. 1981) (per curiam) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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type is available for a taking, along with an additional requirement for
stricter judicial scrutiny, "to mitigate some of the abuses of the expanded public use doctrine, 23 ° and placing the burden of proving
"public use" on the government, with no judicial deference to legislative judgments nor presumption of constitutionality.23 ' Promoting this
sort of change is the recent trend of "courts' willingness to embrace
new ways to limit
private use takings, such as focusing on statutory
232
requirements."

One commentator has argued that it is not cost-efficient for "a taxand
payer to fight a particular piece of special-interest legislation[ ],"
that the information costs of the effect of any one particular issue on
an individual taxpayer are too high, "thereby deterring him from identifying his interests in the first place. ' 233 The answer is to use
Madison's "factions" to defend private property: there are a number
of interest groups already that exist to defend private property
rights. 234 These ideas follow the underpinnings of our institutions:
John Locke's publication of his thesis on "the rights to life, liberty,

and property under limited government, as a social contract," in
1690:235 the Declaration of Independence, reaffirming the concept of
limited government, stating that governments derive "their just pow2 36 on July 4, 1776, and in our
ers from the consent of the governed,
237
federal and state constitutions.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the reconciliation of competing interests, private property versus
jobs, state and local elected officials get to strike the balance-but it is
230. SCHULTZ, supra note 13, at 183.
231. See Paul, supra note 198, at 261 (arguing that eminent domain, as "the power
of the state to seize property against the will of its rightful owner" is wholly
unjustifiable).
232. Wilk, supra note 165, at 274.
233. Kochan, supra note 198, at 81. "Additionally, individual citizen opposition,
such as from the landowner, is unlikely to influence a politician's decision or his electoral chances, for 'the probability that a typical voter will change the outcome of the
election is vanishingly small."' Id. at 82-83.
234. See, e.g., Owners' Council of America, http://www.ownerscounsel.com/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2006) ("Owners' Counsel of America is a voluntary network of experienced eminent domain trial lawyers from every state of the nation in coalitions with
environmental and land use lawyers to assist its members in better serving property
owners in the exercise of their constitutional guarantees of private ownership."); Castle Coalition: Citizens Fighting Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.
org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
235. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
236. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
237. See Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 91 n.6 (Tex. 1997) (stating that "[t]he framers of the Texas Constitution apparently shared the belief that a
constitution was a compact between the government and its citizens[ ]," and then citing to TEX. CONST. art I, § 2 ("All political power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit.")).
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up to the public to demand accountability. Because of voter and court
abdication, per the analysis above, it would appear that interest
groups must bear the burden of public participation revitalization.
The likely success of developing a "brighter" line between individual
property rights and community economic development depends on
the activities of these groups in waking up private property owners to
the potential threat they face from the use of eminent domain for economic development. The system depends on itself to function:
[R]esource allocation is a function of market demand and supply,
which is in turn a function of power, which is a function of property
rights (understood as a mode of participation in decision making, or
power), which are a function of law, which is a function of government, which is a function of the results of the contest over the control of government to use it to protect certain interests rather than
others.
Government and property, therefore, are interdependent variables;
each is both dependent and independent relative to the other; each
is formed and influenced by the other. The ineluctable problems
are always: which, or whose, interests are to count; through which
institutional or power structure are they to be defined so as to
count; and with what legal change of law are legal rights to be
revised.2 38
As one commentator has pointed out, "[a]s lawyers, we are trained to
work within the system, but the system '239
itself is broken; the longer we
merely fiddle, the hotter Rome burns.
The administrative costs of using eminent domain, and the variables
involved in site selection, make it an unusual situation when someone's home is taken for such a purpose. The degree of risk is a function of geographic location, as well as all of the socioeconomic and
political variables that go into the site selection process and the willingness of a municipality to use the power of eminerit domain. But
however great or small the risk, this does not give the homeowner an
excuse to "sleep on his rights." Part of the problem now faced stems
from voter abdication, and a good part of the solution is to reinvigorate voters locally to defend their private property rights if they want
to keep them: "property rights and public use deliberations are political policy questions and should be made by the people because representative decision making is the essence of democracy. "240
PatriciaJ. Askew
238. Introduction to THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GovERNMENT AND PROPERTY 6 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999).
239. Epstein, supra note 67, at 362-63 (commenting on "reliance upon certain government models and public policies invented to address the problems of a different
era.").

240.

SCHULTZ,

supra note 13, at 184.
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